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Gentle Warlords: 
The Potential for Violent Non-State Actors to Provide Stability 
 
Tyler Bembenek 
 
 
In 2003, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a brutal insurgent group widely known for 
committing gross human rights violations, expanded its campaign into Uganda’s Teso and Lango 
sub-regions. The local Ugandan military presence was not strong enough to counter the 
offensive, and the security of the wider region—as well as the safety of the civilian population—
was severely threatened. In response, the Ugandan government authorized the formation of two 
communal defense forces to be drawn from the local population. The resultant ‘Arrow Boys’ and 
‘Rhino Brigade’ militias were formed around specific local ethnic groups, the Iteso and Lango 
respectively. Using ethnic identities to mobilize the militias allowed the state to tap into 
preexisting organizational structures and thus raise the defense forces as quickly and easily as 
possible. 
The militias succeeded in driving back the LRA, particularly in the Teso sub-region. 
However, the government’s communal defense program backfired dramatically. The ethnic call 
to arms used to raise the militias had the adverse effect of heightening inter-ethnic tensions. The 
Acholi ethnic group, from which the LRA had drawn many recruits, was purposely targeted by 
Iteso and Lango soldiers, leading to the deaths of many civilians and causing further chaos. Thus, 
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although the government’s policy reversed the LRA advance, it also created significant 
instability.1 
According to the extant scholarly literature, it is unsurprising that Uganda’s militias had a 
detrimental effect on stability. A significant body of research has explored the destabilizing 
tendencies of violent non-state actors (VNSAs), a loose category used to describe any organized 
armed group that is not part of a regular military force. Recent studies have demonstrated how 
VNSAs incite ethnic violence, undermine rule of law, and disrupt democratization processes. 
Many of these scholars have also examined how irregular armed groups enable cronyism and 
curtail economic development. These studies find that, in many scenarios, the presence of 
VNSAs hinders effective governance, threatening national stability and prosperity.2 
However, there are counterexamples, such as the Syrian Kurdish militias fighting ISIS, 
which suggests that some VNSAs can positively affect stability.3 For many societies, irregular 
armed forces have played an important role in providing security. In U.S. history, militias were 
crucial for securing the defense of the Thirteen Colonies, protecting the civilian population from 
American Indian and French attacks. Modern states continue to rely on VNSAs to provide 
stability, the most visible example of which is the increasing security role of vigilantes in 
                                                 
1 Paul Omach, “Political Violence in Uganda: the Role of Vigilantes and Militias,” The Journal of Social, Political 
and Economic Studies 35, no. 4 (winter 2010); A. Byaruhanga Rukooko, “Protracted Civil War, Civil Militias and 
Political Transition in Uganda since 1986,” in Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace?, ed. David J. 
Francis (Ashgate, 2005), 213-230. 
2 Francis, introduction to Civil Militia, 1-30; Istifanus Zabadi, “Civil Militias: Threats to National and Human 
Security in West Africa,” in Civil Militia, 117-130; Cage Banseka, “The ‘Anti-Gang’ Civil Militias in Cameroon 
and the Threat to National and Human Security,” in Civil Militia, 161-186; Macharia Munene, “Mayi Mayi and 
Interahamwe Militias: Threats to Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region,” in Civil Militia, 231-250; Jeremy 
Ginifer and Hooman Peimani, “Civil Defense Forces and Post-Conflict Security Challenges: International 
Experience and Implications for Africa,” in Civil Militia, 251-280. 
3 Mutlu Civiroglu, “How Kurdish Militias Have Successfully Fought Off the Islamic State,” Vice News, 14 August 
2014, https://news.vice.com/article/how-kurdish-militias-have-successfully-fought-off-the-islamic-state (15 April 
2015). 
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northern Nigeria.4 The question then is why some VNSAs create stability while others lead to 
greater conflict and insecurity. 
I argue that a VNSA’s effect on stability is dependent on two variables: the group’s 
organization type and its relative strength. Organization type—clientelist, communal, or 
corporate –determines how the actor motivates its members, funds operations, and ultimately the 
objectives it pursues. The second variable, relative strength, indicates how militarily powerful 
the group is compared to other VNSAs and the local government. I hypothesize, for example, 
that corporate actors, those organized around a shared but non-ascriptive identity, such as 
membership in a guild or society, generally behave in a manner that is most likely to create 
stability. Because they profit primarily from the practice of their trade, not the activities of war, 
corporate actors tend to be minimally abusive of the civilian population and cause very little 
local instability. Similarly, because they are not mobilized around ascriptive identities, such as 
specific religious or ethnic groups, corporate actors avoid the dangerous identity politics that 
contribute to higher-level societal instability. These positive attributes should hold true whether a 
corporate actor is relatively weak or relatively strong. As a corporate actor grows in relative 
strength, it can push back hostile, destabilizing VNSAs without itself becoming a source of 
instability. 
To illustrate this argument, I examine the case of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a 
confederation of traditional hunting societies, which played an instrumental role in Sierra 
Leone’s 1991-2002 civil war.5 The CDF is an important case because it defies expectations for 
how VNSAs behave. Despite becoming the most powerful armed group in Sierra Leone over the 
                                                 
4 Will Ross, “Boko Haram crisis: Among the Vigilantes of north-east Nigeria,” BBC News, 3 December 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30291040 (14 April 2015). 
5 The CDF is often referred to as the Kamajors, the largest and best known of the CDF’s four major subgroups. Each 
subgroup was associated with a specific ethnicity; the Kamajors represented only the Mende soldiers within the 
larger CDF organization. 
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course of the war, it committed relatively few abuses and never sought political power. Instead, 
the CDF defeated its predatory VNSA rivals, creating stability and protecting the democratically 
elected government. 
This paper has five parts. First, I review the existing literature on violent non-state actors, 
arguing that current scholarship either simply categorizes VNSAs or it explains the behavior of a 
single type of actor, but does not explain variation in behavior across types of VNSAs. Second, I 
present a theory of VNSA behavior and hypothesize how organization type, in combination with 
the actor’s relative strength, influence how such groups affect stability on a local and societal 
level. Third, I present my research design. Fourth, I explore one of my key hypotheses with an 
in-depth examination of the Civil Defense Forces during the Sierra Leone Civil War. Finally, I 
discuss the policy implications of my findings and conclude with suggestions for further 
research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on violent non-state actors can be divided into two camps. In the first 
camp, scholars have focused on categorizing VNSAs and describing their general characteristics. 
While showcasing the great diversity of VNSA types, these studies do not offer a general 
explanation for the behavior of these groups. In the second camp, scholars have created general 
theories of VNSA behavior, frequently emphasizing the importance of resources and economic 
decision-making.  However, this literature often treats all VNSAs as the same, neglecting the 
variability of VSNA types and their wide divergence in behavior. In contrast, this paper advances 
the literature by creating a model of violent non-state actor behavior that also recognizes and 
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incorporates the diversity of VNSA types. Each literature will be discussed in greater depth 
below. 
 The first body of literature focuses on creating a typology of violent non-state actors.6 Of 
particular note is Phil Williams’s article, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and 
International Security,” which provides a list of VNSAs and their basic characteristics, including 
actors such as warlords, gangs, and militias.7 Williams shows that VNSAs vary widely in terms 
of motivation, funding, and other features. In categorizing the different types of VNSAs, he 
suggests some economic rationales for predatory and destabilizing VNSA behavior. However, 
Williams does not explain why various types of VNSAs face different economic incentives. 
Furthermore, the paper omits any discussion of the potentially stabilizing effects of VNSAs. 
 Similarly, Shultz, Farah, and Lochard offer a typology of armed groups, which includes 
insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime syndicates. 8 As with Williams, the authors 
detail the various characteristics of different VNSA types, including leadership, ideology, and 
operational doctrine. While the article concedes that collaboration may be possible between 
states and some VNSAs, such as the Afghan Northern Alliance, it provides no overarching 
theory for VNSA behavior and thus no argument for which VNSAs would be suitable partners 
for states. 
                                                 
6 A number of other authors have made distinctions between VNSAs types, if not explicit typologies. See, for 
example, Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat’s introduction to Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, 
and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat (Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 2007). Within the same volume, Ken Menkhaus’ article, “Local Security Systems in Somali East 
Africa” makes a distinction between ‘warlords’ (what this article would term clientelist VNSAs) and business-
created militias (corporate VNSAs). Similarly, William Reno’s article, “Protectors and Predators: Why is There a 
Difference among West African Militias” identifies religious and ethnic-based VNSAs (communal VNSAs) as 
distinct from purely patronage-based ones (clientelist VNSAs). 
7 Phil Williams, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security,” International Relations and 
Security Network, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich), 2008, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93880 (14 April 2015). 
8 Richard H. Schultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,” 
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, United States Air Force, September 2004, 
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf (14 April 2015). 
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 In the second body of literature, several scholars have developed theories of VNSA 
behavior, often by focusing on the economic decision-making of such groups as they seek to 
mobilize funds and recruits.9 For example, Chojnacki and Branovic explain how the central goal 
of VNSAs is to ensure their survival by strengthening their ability to finance their operations, 
often through the control of territory.10 Within a territory, the probability of predatory versus 
stabilizing behavior depends on what the authors call a “market of violence,” as well as the 
actor’s material and geographical structure. Thus, Chojnacki and Branovic argue that a VNSA’s 
choice between peaceful resource extraction and destructive plundering is in fact an economic 
decision. However, while acknowledging that a group’s ‘material structure’ is important, the 
article does not distinguish among various VNSA types or explain why or how their 
corresponding material structure affects VNSA decision-making and behavior. 
 Louise Andersen employs a similar economic theory.11 Emphasizing the high material 
cost of armed conflict, she explains how VNSAs acquire resources through taxation, drug 
production, and other means. Andersen’s core concept is the idea of the “neopatrimonial state” in 
which politics are driven by patronage. Within these societies, “big men”—that is, wealthy and 
powerful individuals who redistribute resources to their support base—reign supreme. These 
individuals, and their corresponding VNSAs, are in constant conflict over the resources needed 
to fund their patronage networks. Although providing a thorough analysis of clientelist politics, 
Andersen’s paper does not explain non-patronage based VNSAs, such as communal militias. 
                                                 
9 See, in addition, William Reno’s “Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups.” Civil Wars 9, no. 4 
(2007): 324-342, and Andreas Mehler’s, “Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara,” Nord-Süd Aktuell, 
3rd quartile 2004. Alternatively, several articles provide theories for VNSA behavior that are not based, at least 
primarily, on economic logic. See Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas’ “Modeling Violent Non-State Actors: A 
Summary of Concepts and Methods,” Institute for Information Technology Applications, United States Air Force 
Academy, November 2004, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/modeling_vnsa.pdf (14 April 2015). 
10 Sven Chojnacki and Jeljko Branovic, “The Violent Making and Unmaking of Governance in War-Torn Areas of 
Limited Statehood,” in Governance without a State?, ed. Thomas Risse (Columbia University Press, 2011). 
11 Louise Andersen, “What to Do? The Dilemmas of International Engagement in Fragile States,” in Fragile States 
and Insecure People?. 
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 This paper classifies a wide range of VNSAs, while also identifying which groups are 
most likely to enhance stability. Unlike existing typologies, I examine how VNSAs sustain 
themselves in terms of manpower and resources, sorting them into three distinct organization 
types: clientelist, communal, and corporate.12 Because these categories are based on an economic 
rationale, they are compatible with existing economic theories for VNSA behavior. When 
combined with relative strength, which determines the maximum effect a VNSA can have on 
stability, these factors together form a model of VNSA behavior. This model explains the 
mechanics of why VNSAs act in either a stabilizing or destabilizing manner, while also 
recognizing variation among VNSA organization types. 
 
A MODEL OF VNSA BEHAVIOR 
This section presents a theoretical framework that explains how, as well as the degree to which, 
violent non-state actors affect stability. First, I present a typology of VNSA organization types, 
dividing extra-legal armed groups into three categorizes: clientelist, communal, and corporate. 
Second, I explain how these types of actors have different means of sustaining their resources 
and manpower, characteristics that ultimately determine their organization’s objectives. Third, I 
discuss how the relative strength of VNSAs determines their ability to pursue their objectives. 
Finally, I discuss my model of VNSA behavior, demonstrating how organization type and 
relative strength together shape a group’s overall effect on stability. 
 
  
                                                 
12 A method recommended by DCAF and Geneva in “Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends and Future 
Challenges,” DCAF Horizon Working Paper Series, no. 5 (2015), as well as, less directly, Andreas Mehler, 
“Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara.”  
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VNSA Organization Type 
Non-state actors can be classified according to their organization type: clientelist, communal, and 
corporate. This distinction is determined by the core identity around which the group is 
organized. In turn, these divergent organizational structures affect how a VNSA acquires 
manpower and resources as well as the objectives it pursues. 
 
Clientelist VNSAs 
Clientelist actors, such as the forces of Tajik Colonel Mahmud Khudayberdiev, are organizations 
in which the participants have no connection beyond their shared service to the group.13 These 
VNSAs are typically labeled as “warlord” factions and include groups such as bands of brigands 
or mercenaries. At the core of these groups are “big men”: warlords, local aristocracy, and other 
powerful individuals who use the organization to enhance their own wealth and influence.14 
While members of a clientelist VNSA may be drawn exclusively from a single ethnic or 
religious community, these identities are secondary. Instead, it is participation in the 
organization’s patronage system which defines membership. Because they share no bonds, the 
members of a clientelist VNSA do not promote any sort of collective good. Instead, recruitment 
and membership are driven by a mix of material compensation and coercion. Material 
compensation, in particular, is crucial for the organization’s survival; without material 
incentives, the group’s foot soldiers would defect. This compensation can be passed down as 
                                                 
13 Troy Thomas and Stephen Kiser, “Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia,” USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies, United States Air Force, May 2002, 
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/ocp/ocp43.pdf (15 April 2015); Abbas Djavadi, “Tajikistan: Government Includes 
Strongman on Negotiating Team,” Radio Free Europe, 9 February 1997, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1083754.html (15 April 2015). 
14 Andersen, “What to Do?.” 
 9 
money through patronage channels, but is also frequently provided in the form of war spoils, 
illicit goods, and a license to pillage.  
 Clientelist actors provide few of their own resources and instead rely on extracting 
income from external sources. This income can be in the form of taxes imposed on the 
population, plundering rival territory, siphoning off public funds, and stealing aid donations. 
These resources are used to buy supplies and equipment, but are equally vital for compensating 
members. 
 
Communal VNSAs 
Communal groups are formed around a shared ascriptive identity, often a specific ethnic, 
religious, or geographic community. These VNSAs include organizations such as the Kurdish 
YPG in Syria and the Muslim-Arab Janjaweed in Sudan. Unlike clientelist actors, communal 
groups recruit and maintain membership primarily through identity politics. Foot soldiers are 
enlisted to promote the collective good of the greater community. Members are rewarded for 
their service by the collective, sometimes with material compensation, but primarily through 
increased influence and prestige. However, because communal actors are formed around 
ascriptive identities, they are subject to a powerful in-group, out-group dynamic. Members are 
expected to act towards the exclusive benefit of their community even at the expense of others, 
creating a zero-sum environment.  
 Communal groups are usually internally funded, drawing resources from their own 
constituencies. Furthermore, with less need for material incentives, recruiting soldiers is 
relatively inexpensive. The community produces enough goods and income to provide for its 
militia, even if it often cannot acquire sophisticated weaponry. 
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Corporate VNSAs 
Corporate actors are formed around a non-ascriptive identity, such as membership in a common 
association or profession. These VNSAs primarily consist of guilds and societies, groups whose 
preexisting organizational structure enables them to easily create a collective action force.15 
Participants in corporate VNSAs are either members of the guilds themselves or hired help. In 
either case, they are acting out of self-interest and expect to be compensated through the profits 
of their particular trade. The Bakassi Boys in southeastern Nigeria are an example of a corporate 
militia; they are paid, supported, and organized by local market guilds.16 As with clientelist 
actors, corporate groups sometimes draw their members exclusively from a single ethnic or 
religious community, but these communal identities do not define membership and are not the 
group’s primary motivating force. 
Corporate actors rely on a mix of internal and external funding. If they organize around a 
revenue-producing institution, such as an industrial guild, then the practice of their trade 
generates income. However, this income is dependent on external sources, individuals who 
supply their inputs and purchase their product. Thus, even revenue-producing corporate VNSAs 
are not entirely self-sufficient.  Non-revenue-producing groups are even more reliant on external 
funding from civilians and other sponsors. Nonetheless, because corporate foot soldiers are 
fighting for a collective good that will ultimately benefit themselves, they require less direct 
material compensation than clientelist soldiers. 
 
  
                                                 
15 Bruce Baker, “Nonstate Providers of Everyday Security in Fragile African States,” in Fragile States. 
Kenneth Omeje, “The Egbesu and Bakassi Boys: African Spiritism and the Mystical Re-traditionalisation of 
Security,” in Civil Militia. 
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Table 1: Typology of Violent Non-State Actors 
 
 Clientelist Communal Corporate 
Core identity None Ascriptive Non-ascriptive 
Means of retaining 
membership 
Material 
compensation 
Communal 
obligations 
Self-interest 
Source of revenue External extraction Internal support Mixed 
 
 
VNSA Objectives 
Thus, the core identity around which a VNSA is formed plays a crucial role in 
determining how the organization sustains its membership and revenue. However, a group’s core 
identity, in combination with the methods by which it sustains itself, also determines the 
organization’s collective objectives and its means to achieving them. 
Organized primarily around a desire for material gain, clientelist actors, above all else, 
seek to profit from force of arms. However, to maintain their ranks, and thus their power, they 
need a steady flow of income to compensate their soldiers and prevent them from defecting. 
Because they themselves generate no income, they achieve their objectives by maximizing the 
amount of resources they can extract from external sources. In turn, this means that they must 
control wealth-producing assets, such as raw resource extraction sites, commercial transit routes, 
or the population itself. These sites are jealously guarded against competitors and fully exploited, 
often through heavy taxation, to generate maximum revenue.17 This extraction may be carried 
out in a highly organized manner, particularly by more professional mercenary groups, but, 
                                                 
17 Andersen, “What to Do?.” 
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depending on the internal discipline of the VNSA, it is often more chaotic. 18  In the less 
disciplined groups, a common means of compensating foot soldiers is by authorizing their 
members to pillage and loot local communities. 
 Organized around a specific ascriptive identity, communal actors seek to defend and 
empower their constituency. The means of achieving this objective are to increase their relative 
strength, either by bolstering themselves or weakening their potential rivals. To do so, they must 
claim sources of power and resources for their community. Crucially, because communal 
VNSAs rely almost entirely on internal support and funding from their constituency, their 
prosperity does not depend on the goodwill of external actors. In fact, communal groups are 
incentivized to appropriate as many wealth-producing assets as possible and concentrate them 
solely in the hands of their own constituency. By dominating the sources of power, communal 
groups can bolster their own defenses, while keeping other actors too weak to pose a threat.19 
 Corporate soldiers are collectively motivated to profit from their trade. To do so, they 
must remove obstacles to their profession or lifestyle as quickly and efficiently as possible. Other 
groups that pose a threat or impose costs on their trade will be driven back, deterred, and 
neutralized. Because their professions are reliant on broad external support rather than a specific 
constituency, corporate VNSAs are incentivized to maintain, if not cordial, at least neutral 
relationships with outside communities. 
 
  
                                                 
18 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). For an example of a more 
professional extractive policy, see the role of Executive Outcomes, a South African mercenary corporation that was 
active in the Sierra Leone Civil War. 
19 Chojnacki and Branovic, “The Violent Making and Unmaking of Governance.” 
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Table 2: VNSA Objectives 
  
Clientelist 
 
 
Communal 
 
 
Corporate 
 
Collective objective 
Profit from force of 
arms 
Defend constituency 
Profit from trade, 
profession, or lifestyle 
Means of achieving 
objective 
Maximize extraction 
from external sources 
Claim resources for 
community, keep 
other groups weak 
Remove barriers to 
trade, profession, or 
lifestyle 
 
VNSA Relative Strength 
No VNSA operates in a vacuum. Instead, they must contend with other armed groups as well as 
government forces. Sometimes these organizations cooperate, but more often they are competing 
or hostile.20 Relative strength—that is, the comparative military power of a VNSA—determines 
the means by and extent to which it can pursue its objectives. The greater a group’s relative 
strength, the greater its capability to inflict destabilizing violence and economic exploitation—or 
prevent other VNSAs from doing so. This factor is equally important for all VNSA types. 
 
Predicting VNSA Behavior 
VNSAs behave in a stability-inducing or stability-degrading manner depending on the objectives 
they pursue and their process of achieving them. However, their ability to actually affect stability 
is contingent on their relative strength. Simply put, strong actors have a greater potential effect 
on stability, whereas weak groups have very little ability to influence stability either positively or 
negatively. 
 Stability comprises two components, local stability and societal stability. Local stability 
constitutes the everyday security of individuals within the geographic area where a VNSA is 
                                                 
20 Mehler, “Oligopolies of Violence.” 
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present. Acts of theft, forced dispossession, and physical violence, among others, all diminish 
local stability. In contrast, societal stability assesses the relationships between national 
demographic groups, measured on a nation-wide basis. Sectarian or ethnic tension—or, in more 
extreme cases, open conflict—decreases societal stability. 
 
The Behavior of Clientelist VNSAs 
At a very weak relative strength, clientelist actors have a minimal impact on stability, either local 
or societal. In order to fund their war effort and their own material needs, foot soldiers will prey 
upon the nearby civilian population, looting their property and dispossessing them of valuables.21 
However, the group is too weak to overcome significant resistance, so even their ability to 
assault relatively defenseless communities is limited. 
As the VNSA grows in relative strength, it will overcome village defense forces and its 
weaker rivals, adding more resources and territory to exploit. This extraction is often violent, 
dramatically decreasing local stability. Instability is particularly rife in recently captured areas 
where discipline has not yet been established and reprisals against captured rivals are common. If 
the affected area becomes sufficiently large, societal instability will also start to increase as the 
state’s failure to protect the civilian population causes political fracturing and distrust. The 
vulnerable population will retreat to core, sub-national identities, organizing communal defense 
forces. 
As the clientelist group becomes strong or even dominant, local stability may actually 
increase. Areas that are deeper in their territory, and thus farther removed from the front line, are 
subject to less predation and a more organized, if still harsh, extractive program. As discipline 
has been established in these areas, violence is less random. Instead, to maximize long-term 
                                                 
21 This scenario assumes that the clientelist VNSA is not receiving outside funding. 
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revenue, extraction is more systematic and sustainable—more akin to taxation than looting.22 
Toll-collecting roadblocks are created and raw resource extraction sites are worked to their 
maximum capacity. However, societal stability should decrease as the state’s security failures 
become increasingly intolerable for affected communities. Political fracturing intensifies and 
tension rises over the control and allocation of resources. Fortunately, this decrease in societal 
stability may be somewhat negated if national armed groups band together to balance the 
growing strength of the clientelist VNSAs. 
 
 
 
The Behavior of Communal VNSAs 
A weak communal actor will also have a relatively limited overall effect on stability. The 
organization of communal defense forces may succeed in pushing back bandits and other weak 
                                                 
22 Chojnacki and Branovic, “The Violent Making and Unmaking of Governance”; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy 
M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 
(August 2006). 
Figure 1: Clientalist Actor’s Effects on Stability 
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predatory groups, increasing local stability. However, the VNSA is too weak to project force 
beyond its core territory and must rely primarily on defensive tactics. Thus, its activities do not 
pose a threat to other ethnic and sectarian groups and will have little effect on societal stability. 
As the communal VNSA gains in strength, it will use its increased combat capability to 
expand its operations, resisting threats to the collective and increasing local stability. However, it 
will be tempted to use its strength to seize resources from other, not necessarily hostile, groups. 
Controlling these resources would aid its constituency and, because communal VNSAs are only 
dependent on internal support, would further increase its own power. Thus, an intra-state security 
dilemma emerges such that, in the absence of a strong central government, each community 
seeks to monopolize resources and other sources of power, even at the expensive of its peers.23 
This zero-sum security environment means that the empowerment of one community is 
threatening to all others, as no single community can be entirely sure of the others’ intentions. 
Consequently, as the communal actor begins to grow stronger than rival groups, the balance of 
power is disrupted and societal stability dramatically decreases. This escalation of 
intercommunal tensions is very likely to escalate into open conflict. Preemptive attacks against 
rival groups lead to tit-for-tat retaliation and an escalating cycle of violence, significantly 
decreasing local stability particularly in ethnically or religiously mixed areas. 
As the communal VNSA becomes stronger, societal and local stability continue to 
decline. Communal identities are essentially unalterable, so losing parties in an inter-communal 
engagement do not have the ability to surrender or defect to the winning side; having a different 
ethnic, religious, or geographic identity disqualifies them from membership. Thus, their only 
option is to fight on even more tenaciously, escalating violence. Attacks against rival civilian 
populations become increasingly brutal and, in their most extreme form, potentially devolve into 
                                                 
23 Chojnacki and Branovic, “The Violent Making and Unmaking of Governance.” 
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genocide. Assuming all factions have the capacity to keep fighting, this brutality will only abate 
if one party becomes dominant, an unlikely scenario. 
 
 
 
The Behavior of Corporate VNSAs 
A weak corporate actor should slightly increase local stability. Organizing forces to protect its 
operations, it will secure areas vital to its trade, such as roads, markets, and port facilities. 
Because the VNSA is not directly responsible to a specific communal constituency, it may not 
protect the civilian population as effectively as would a communal VNSA. No major ethnic or 
sectarian groups are threatened by the corporate actor’s defensive measures, so societal stability 
remains unaffected. 
As the corporate actor grows in strength, it will expand its area of operations to subdue 
the gangs, paramilitaries, and other predatory organizations that threaten its trade. Although this 
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Figure 2: Communal Actor’s Effects on Stability 
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action is taken out of self-interest, it provides a positive security externality.24 Areas that were 
once vulnerable to bandits and criminals are now secured, increasing local stability. Corporate 
foot soldiers mostly abstain from looting local property as civilian support remains a necessary 
source of funding and supplies. Societal stability again remains mostly unaffected. 
As the VNSA becomes very strong or dominant, local stability remains high. Although it 
is very powerful, the corporate actor does not inherently pose a threat to the nation’s ethnic and 
religious communities. Instead, societal stability should increase, as many of the country’s 
destabilizing predatory groups have been significantly curtailed. Thus, a very strong corporate 
actor creates significantly higher levels of local stability and, to a lesser degree, societal stability. 
As such, a dominant corporate actor represents the best-case scenario for the provision of 
security. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Ken Menkhaus labels this positive externality a ‘security shadow’ in his article, “Local Security Systems in 
Somali East Africa”. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper examines the case of the Civil Defense Forces during the 1991-2002 Sierra Leone 
Civil War. This longitudinal case study allows us to analyze how changes in relative strength 
affect stability. As the CDF, a corporate VNSA, increased in relative strength over the course of 
the civil war, we expect to see local stability rise significantly, with a somewhat smaller increase 
in societal stability. 
A case study of the CDF is ideal for two reasons. First, as very little research has been 
done on stabilizing VNSAs, this analysis will illustrate the utility of my model and specifically 
the explanatory ability of the two independent variables, organization type and relative strength. 
Second, while I could examine any of the three actor types, the Civil Defense Forces, as a 
corporate group, constitute the best-case scenario and thus provide the most significant policy 
insights. Unlike many better-known VNSAs, the CDF was particularly adept at providing 
stability. In this regard, the case of the CDF is especially suitable, having puzzled observers as an 
apparent anomaly.  
 In order to categorize VNSAs, it is necessary to construct a measure of organization type. 
Clientelist actors often—but do not always—have heterogeneous membership, recruiting their 
soldiers from multiple demographic communities. Additionally, because clientelist foot soldiers 
serve the organization in return for material compensation, the soldiers must receive some sort of 
material income. This income does not necessarily have to be in the form of regular cash 
payments—it may also constitute drugs, women, or an authorization to pillage.25 If for some 
reason members stop receiving material compensation, their allegiance to the VNSA should end.  
                                                 
25 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra 
Leone, June-August 2003,” Columbia University, 2004, http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/SL.htm (16 April 
2015): 26-28. 
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In contrast, communal actors are most easily identified through their own rhetoric. 
Communal groups claim to represent a single ascriptive community and explicitly act on behalf 
of that collective. Their membership should be almost entirely homogenous along ethnic or 
religious lines.  
Finally, corporate groups should have an ethnically or religiously heterogeneous 
membership, though that is less likely among smaller and more localized VNSAs. However, 
almost all participants in a corporate organization should be members of a single guild, society, 
or industry, or be connected to that institution through family or friends. 
 The other variable, relative strength, runs on a spectrum from weak to dominant and 
measures the relative number of armed combatants a VNSA can field. The weakest actors muster 
fewer soldiers than the majority of their domestic rivals, including the government. Conversely, 
stronger VNSAs field more soldiers than most of their rivals. A dominant actor has more fighters 
than all of its rivals combined. 
Finally, the dependent variable is the level of stability, both local and societal. Local 
stability can be measured through the level of violence, particularly fatalities but also instances 
of mutilation or sexual violence. Local stability also comprises economic insecurity, whether in 
the form of looting, non-government sanctioned taxation, or forced labor.26  
Societal instability can be somewhat more difficult to measure. It is most visible in acts 
of violence carried out along ethnic, sectarian, or other ascriptive lines. It can also be measured 
through the presence of media broadcasts denouncing specific ethnic or religious communities or 
inciting violence. Societal instability is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by violent regime 
                                                 
26 Note that local stability only includes those areas where the VNSA is itself present. This case study uses two 
different proxy measurements to estimate local stability. First, I examine just the CDF’s own abuses across time, as 
any abuses the CDF committed must have occurred within territory that it controlled or contested. Second, I track 
the number of abuses that occurred in Bo district, one of the hotspots of CDF activity. 
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changes and coups.27 For this case study, I use all available data to estimate the changing value 
of stability, including surveys, media reports, and expert analyses. 
 
THE CDF AND THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR 
The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an 
insurgent group primarily comprised of disaffected youth and backed by Charles Taylor’s 
Liberian forces, launched an attack against the Sierra Leonean town of Bomaru. The Sierra 
Leone Army (SLA) was unable or unwilling to resist this incursion. Within months, the 
insurgency had spread throughout much of the country, leading to wide-scale humanitarian 
suffering. In the chaos of the conflict, a grassroots corporate VNSA was formed to protect the 
civilian population.28 The Civil Defense Forces (CDF), as this group came to be known, played 
an instrumental role in the war, helping to defeat the RUF and create a lasting peace. 
 My theory predicts that the CDF, as a corporate actor, should have positively affected 
both local and societal stability as the organization grew in relative strength. Their actions, as 
discussed below, are mostly consistent with this hypothesis. However, during the 1996-1998 
period, when the CDF first grew stronger than its rivals, there was an unexpected drop in both 
societal and local stability. The increase in violence was due to an intra-state institutional 
security dilemma, which adds an important new dimension to a theory of intra-state power 
dynamics and should be incorporated in future studies. 
 The following case study has five sections. First, I demonstrate that the Civil Defense 
Forces constituted a corporate VNSA. Second, I show that the CDF’s relative strength increased 
                                                 
27 Incidents of protests and rioting, although not examined in this case study, are also indicators of societal 
instability. 
28 Patrick K. Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-
Insurgency,” Africa Development 12, no. 3/4 (1997): 77-79. 
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over three distinct phases: the start of conflict in 1991 to the SLPP’s 1996 election victory, the 
1996 election to the RUF’s 1999 capture of Freetown, and the seizure of Freetown until the 
war’s conclusion in 2002. Third, I present my findings for each phase, examining whether the 
CDF’s effects on stability were consistent with the model’s predictions. Fourth, I summarize the 
findings and discuss deviations from the model’s expectations. Finally, I conclude the case study 
by considering potential alternative explanations. 
 
The CDF as a Corporate VNSA 
Corporate VNSAs are those formed around a non-ascriptive identity, such as membership in a 
society or guild. To show that the Civil Defense Forces constituted a corporate VNSA, we need 
to demonstrate that its membership was primarily organized around this type of shared 
association. Similarly, the CDF should not exhibit the features of either a clientelist or a 
communal actor, namely a reliance on material compensation or an inherently exclusive, 
ascriptive identity. 
 The Civil Defense Forces were organized around traditional hunting societies, a shared 
yet non-ascriptive identity. Hunting societies played an important and long-standing role in pre-
civil war Sierra Leonean culture. 29  Unlike the profit-driven guilds of European history, the 
purpose of these associations was primarily one of civil defense, protecting local communities 
from wild animals and criminals.30 While individual members were connected with specific, 
ethnic communities, the greater hunter society was not confined to any single ethnic group. 
Indeed, the Civil Defense Forces included large numbers of volunteers from the Kuranko, 
                                                 
29 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 85-86. 
30 Danny Hoffman, “The Meaning of a Militia: Understanding the Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone,” African 
Affairs 106, no. 425 (2007): 643, 647. 
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Temne, Kono, and Mende ethnicities.31  Although sub-factions within the CDF were mostly 
ethnically homogenous, the organization as a whole was heterogeneous.32 Unlike a communal 
actor, the CDF never fought specifically on the behalf of a particular ascriptive identity, and it is 
telling that its major rival, the RUF, had a similar ethnic composition. The CDF was also not a 
clientelist group, as its recruits did not receive significant material compensation. Drug use and 
sexual license—both forms of material compensation—were expressly forbidden, as was the 
looting of valuables. Indeed, a post-war survey suggests that the majority of CDF soldiers did not 
expect to materially profit from their service.33  The survey asked participants whether their 
faction had given them food, money, drugs, diamonds, or women. With the exception of 
diamonds, which were not frequently offered as an incentive, and food, CDF soldiers received 
much fewer spoils than their counterparts in other factions. 
 
CDF Relative Strength 
The Civil Defense Forces grew in strength over three distinct phases. The first phase lasted from 
the beginning of the conflict in March of 1991 until the Sierra Leone People’s Party’s (SLPP) 
election victory in spring of 1996. It was during this period that the Civil Defense Forces were 
first mobilized, and they remained relatively weak. Although the precise numbers are difficult to 
estimate, their initial number of recruits was limited, primarily serving as auxiliaries for SLA 
units.34 It was not until 1993 that the CDF sub-factions began to organize into a distinct fighting 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Handling and Mishandling Civilians,” 441. 
33 Humphreys and Weinstein, “What the Fighters Say”; Hoffman, “The Meaning of a Militia,” 657-8. This does not 
hold true for a number of the CDF’s partners, most notably the South African mercenary corporation Executive 
Outcomes as well as allied Liberian contingents. Both of these groups constituted clientelist actors. Note, however, 
that my theory focuses purely on domestic groups. It may be that VNSAs behave differently and have different 
effects on stability outside of their home country. 
34 Nathalie Wlodarcyzk, “Politically Enfranchising the Non-political: Safeguarding Peace through Civic Education 
and Inclusion? The Civil Defense Forces in Sierra Leone,” Civil Wars 11, no. 2 (June 2009): 203. 
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force. Although they won some significant victories against the RUF, total CDF enlistment, even 
by 2006, was estimated at only 2,500 members.35 In comparison, the SLA and RUF both fielded 
forces of around 10,000.36 
 The second phase of the war saw the CDF grow significantly, surpassing its rivals in 
relative strength. Following the SLPP’s 1996 election victory, government support for the Civil 
Defense Forces increased dramatically, including both material and political aid.37 As evidence 
of the CDF’s rising status, Kamajor chief Samuel Hinga Norman was appointed as Deputy 
Defense Minister. 38  The organization’s reputation as a fierce and successful fighting force 
encouraged many new recruits. 39  In contrast, combat reversals led to a high level of RUF 
desertions, while a number of SLA units were demobilized or confined to barracks.40 The 1997 
AFRC coup spurred additional CDF recruitment as many citizens enlisted to protect the 
democratically elected government.41 New recruits included fighters from neighboring Liberia 
and Guinea as well as members of the Sierra Leonean diaspora.42 By summer 1997, there were 
up to 37,000 Kamajors, making up the largest sub-faction of the CDF.43 In contrast, the RUF 
fielded no more than 20,000 soldiers.44 
 In the third and final phase of the conflict, the CDF grew into Sierra Leone’s dominant 
military force. Recruitment continued to expand the organization’s ranks, while battlefield losses 
                                                 
35 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 90. 
36 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 3A (2004): 146, 174. 
37 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 98; Wlodarcyzk, “Politically Enfranchising the Non-political,” 204. However, the 
CDF was not officially recognized as a legal entity until after the SLPP government was reinstated in 1998. 
38 Mariane C. Ferme and Danny Hoffman, “Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra 
Leone and Beyond,” Africa Today 50, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 76. 
39 Wlodarcyzk, “Politically Enfranchising the Non-political,” 204. 
40 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 98. 
41 Rebecca Jones, “State failure and extra-legal justice: vigilante groups, civil militias and the rule of law in West 
Africa,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges, research paper no. 166 (October 2008): 4. 
42 Ferme and Hoffman, “Hunter Militias,” 76. 
43 “Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone--Tension in Bo as Hunter Militiamen Gather,” Agence France Presse, 29 May 2007. 
(World News Connection) 
44 “Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone--AFP Gives 'Estimates' of Fighting Forces,” Agence France Presse, 7 January 1999. 
(World News Connection) 
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degraded the RUF and AFRC’s combat strength. By the end of the war in 2002, the CDF was 
much larger than either of its rivals, with a self-reported strength of 99,000 soldiers. Although 
this figure is likely to be highly exaggerated, a more accurate picture of the CDF’s relative 
strength can be determined through post-war disarmament statistics. Out of the 46,000 former 
combatants who took part in the disarmament process, 37,000 were CDF fighters, revealing the 
CDF’s disproportionately large manpower.45 
 
CDF Effects on Stability 
This section details the CDF’s effects on local and societal stability across all three phases of the 
war. It also includes a short analysis of post-conflict stability. 
 
Phase 1: March 1991 – March 1996 
During the first phase of the war, the CDF remained a relatively weak corporate VNSA. My 
model predicts that local stability should have increased slightly while societal stability remained 
largely unaffected. The evidence mostly supports this prediction. 
Societal stability remained mostly unchanged during the first phase of the war. On April 
29, 1992, disaffected army officers, angered by the government’s failure to effectively combat 
the RUF insurgency, launched a military coup. The officers successfully seized power and 
instated the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as Sierra Leone’s new government.46 
This politically volatile situation formed the backdrop for the CDF’s emergence and is the 
benchmark against which subsequent societal instability is measured. In fact, political tensions 
seemed to have eased somewhat during this period. By 1996, the situation was calm enough to 
                                                 
45 Ferme and Hoffman, “Hunter Militias,” 76. 
46 Joe Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone: Liberators or Nihilists?,” in “Civil Militia,” 54. 
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allow for the peaceful election of the SLPP. However, major sources of societal tension 
persisted. While the CDF’s rise did not incite ethnic or religious conflict, it did provoke 
resistance from the military establishment.47 The SLA resented the growing power of the CDF as 
a rival for the government’s favor. Furthermore, many SLA soldiers were ill disciplined, 
attacking and looting the populations they were supposed to defend. These fighters, labeled as 
“sobels” or soldier-rebels, were seen by many civilians as a greater threat than even the RUF.48 
This predatory behavior brought SLA units into conflict with CDF forces defending the local 
communities, often resulting in violence. Many members of the SLA, including elements of its 
leadership, materially and politically benefitted from the conflict and the CDF threatened those 
profits. This rising tension constituted an intra-state, institutional security dilemma between the 
two competing national defense organizations, the army versus the CDF. The empowerment of 
one group inherently threatened the interests of the other. 
In terms of local stability, the number of CDF abuses increased during this period. While 
this appears to be a contradictory finding, this may be due to the organization’s growing size and 
area of operations; it is unclear whether the number of violations per area actually increased. 
Overall, the CDF’s absolute level of abuse remained relatively low at 525 recorded incidents. In 
contrast, the RUF was recorded as committing 13,657 human rights violations during the same 
period. 49  Bo district, a center of CDF operations, saw a slight decrease in the number of 
violations, from 473 in 1991 to average of 415.6 per year between 1992 and 1996.50 Given this 
                                                 
47 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 51, 63. 
48 A. B. Zack-Williams, “Kamajors, ‘Sobel’ & the Militariat: Civil Society & the Return of the Military in Sierra 
Leonean Politics,” Review of African Political Economy, no. 73 (1997): 375. 
49 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2 (2004): 39. 
50 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendices (2004): 12. However, the number of violations in 
both 1994 and 1995 were higher than in 1991. 
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measure’s constrained geographic dimension, it may be a more accurate estimate of local 
stability during this period. 
 
Phase 2: March 1996 – January 1999 
During the second phase of the war, the CDF grew into a strong corporate VNSA. According to 
the model, local stability should continue to increase, while societal stability should remain 
unaffected. However, the evidence from this period diverges significantly from these predictions, 
particularly for societal stability. 
 Societal stability decreased dramatically during the second phase of the conflict. Disloyal 
elements of the SLA were increasingly endangered by the CDF’s growing strength. The 
appointment of Kamajor leader Samuel Hinga Norman was of particular concern as it threatened 
to divert resources away from the SLA to the CDF.51 Open conflict broke out between SLA and 
CDF units, leading to a number of violent clashes.52 CDF soldiers, in an attempt to reduce sobel 
attacks against the civilian population, preemptively raided nearby SLA bases, disarming the 
military fighters and appropriating their equipment. These tensions culminated in the May 1997 
coup in which a group of army officers overthrew the government.53 In its place, they installed 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, a military junta aligned with the RUF. 54  This 
AFRC/RUF alliance dramatically escalated the conflict, launching a renewed offensive against 
the CDF and other loyalist forces.55 
                                                 
51 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 58. 
52 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 95-6. 
53 “Sierra Leone: Army, Kamajors Rivalry Said Key Cause of Sierra Leone Coup,” Agence France Presse, 25 May 
1997. (World News Connection) 
54 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 59. 
55 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 60. Loyal forces included an ECOMOG contingent, a multilateral 
armed force created by ECOWAS, a regional group of West African nations. There were about 5,000, mostly 
Nigerian, ECOMOG troops operating in Sierra Leone at the height of the conflict.  
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 The effect on local stability during this period is mixed. On one hand, the number of CDF 
abuses per year rose significantly after the AFRC coup, from 87.67 in phase 1, to 401.75 in 
phase 2. 56  The CDF targeted and often killed those civilians they deemed to be AFRC 
collaborators.57 However, within Bo district, violations against civilians decreased to an average 
of 171.25, less than half the level of the previous period.58 It is likely that the CDF consolidated 
its hold on the area, preventing RUF attacks, while also reducing pressure to target civilian 
collaborators.59 This increase in stability was likely offset by a dramatic increase in violence 
within more contested regions—areas threatened by the AFRC/RUF offensive. 
 
Phase 3: January 1999 – January 2002 
During the third phase of the war, beginning with the loyalist recapture of Freetown in January 
of 1999, the CDF emerged as the strongest military force within Sierra Leone. As a dominant 
corporate VNSA, the model predicts that societal and particularly local stability should have 
improved, and the evidence supports this prediction. 
  Societal stability increased during the third phase of the war. The loyalists’ battlefield 
victories greatly reduced AFRC/RUF combat strength, pressuring the rebels into signing the 
Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999.60 Although the resulting cease-fire failed to end the conflict, 
opposition to the AFRC/RUF forces solidified. By 2000, UN, British, ECOMOG, and Guinean 
contingents assisted the CDF and the movement garnered significant popular support.61 This 
coalition force finally emerged victorious, forcing the RUF to disarm and officially ending the 
                                                 
56 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2, 39. 
57 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 62. 
58 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendices, 12. 
59 Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia,” 96. 
60 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 61. 
61 See volume 2 in the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report for descriptions of all of the 
armed factions that participated in the war. 
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conflict in 2002.62 As with the previous phases of the war, there is little evidence to suggest 
widespread ethnic or religious persecution.63 
 Local stability also increased during this period. The number of violations committed by 
the CDF dropped to an annual average of 215, nearly half its phase 2 level, although still higher 
than in phase 1.64  Given the much expanded size of the CDF as well as its large area of 
operations, this data suggests that the organization was, on average, committing comparably few 
abuses by the end of the war. In Bo district, the number of recorded violations decreased to an 
average of 63.5 per year, by far the lowest level in the conflict.65 
 
Post-Conflict Period 
Although they were the most powerful faction in Sierra Leone by the end of the war, the CDF 
demobilized instead of seeking political concessions.66 The CDF’s return to civilian life allowed 
for the peaceful reinstatement of the SLPP government and the creation of a new military 
institution, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, in which the CDF played no part.67 
Sierra Leone has remained stable since the cessation of hostilities. It has successfully managed 
three peaceful, democratic elections, including the 2007 transfer of power from the SLPP to its 
rival, the All People’s Congress party.68 These elections were deemed as generally free and 
                                                 
62 Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 63. 
63 Ibid. 51. 
64 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2, 39. 
65 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendices, 12. 
66 Humphreys and Weinstein, “What the Fighters Say,” 4. Nearly 75 percent of CDF soldiers returned to their home 
communities at the conclusion of the war. In contrast, only 34 percent of RUF fighters did so. 
67 Humphreys and Weinstein, “What the Fighters Say,” 39; Alie, “The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone,” 64. In fact, 
the total exclusion of the CDF from the new security structure is largely due to politics. The rivalry between the 
military and the CDF persisted after the conclusion of the war. 
68 “Sierra Leone: IRIN Reports Less Violence Than Predicted as Voting day Nears,” UN Integrated Regional 
Information Network, 9 August 2007. (World News Connection) 
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fair. 69  The country has continued to avoid ethnic or religious conflict and has no active 
insurgencies. Although some CDF soldiers later fought in Liberia, the vast majority have 
disarmed.70 Altogether, there is a very high degree of local and societal stability in Sierra Leone. 
 
Assessing the effect of the CDF on Stability in Sierra Leone 
As a corporate actor growing in relative strength, the CDF generally produced the predicted 
effects on stability. Both local and societal stability increased during phases 1 and 3 of the 
conflict. However, evidence from phase 2 runs contrary to my prediction. While the CDF’s 
precise impact on local stability during this period remains unclear, societal stability significantly 
decreased as tensions between the CDF and SLA broke out into open conflict. This type of 
institutional intra-state security dilemma was not anticipated in my model of VNSA behavior. 
However, this divergent finding is not inconsistent with the logic of my theory. It is 
unlikely that either a clientelist or a communal actor would have avoided provoking the SLA’s 
backlash. Rather, it is probable that the SLA would have opposed any VNSA threatening its 
power, regardless of the type of actor. Considering that significant elements within the army 
were profiting from the war, any group that posed a reasonable chance of ending the conflict 
would have been viewed as a threat. Indeed, it is probable that clientelist and particularly 
communal VNSAs would have created even more societal unrest by not only provoking the SLA 
but also inciting ethnic or other inter-communal violence. 
Over the course of the entire war, the CDF acted in the expected manner, increasing both 
local and societal stability as the VNSA grew in strength. The CDF’s positive effects on stability 
are exemplified by two pieces of evidence. First, the CDF committed only 6 percent of the 
                                                 
69 “Sierra Leone: Earnest Bai Koroma wins presidential poll,” BBC News, 23 November 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20472962 (14 April 2015). 
70 Wlodarcyzk, “Politically Enfranchising the Non-political,” 209. 
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human rights abuses recorded by Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 
contrast, the RUF and the SLA/AFRC committed 60.5 and 16.6 percent respectively.71 This data 
suggests that local stability was relatively much higher in CDF controlled areas. Second, despite 
the CDF’s dominant military presence by the end of the war, it fully disarmed and the country 
was able to successfully transition into a peaceful democracy. This process would have been 
impossible without a high level of societal stability. 
 
 
 
 Although the CDF generally increased stability as expected, it is possible that other 
factors also contributed to increased stability. Two arguments are particularly plausible. 
The first argues that it was the presence of foreign troops, such as United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers, which was the key factor in improving 
Sierra Leone’s stability. Additionally, foreign soldiers may have acted as a moderating force on 
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the CDF, preventing it from committing abuses. Foreign forces certainly played an important 
role in the fight against the RUF and in protecting the civilian population. Overall, foreign troops 
committed very few human rights violations and local stability was almost certainly improved in 
the areas where they operated. Among the first foreign units to support the Sierra Leonean 
government was Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African private military contractor. EO 
seems to have performed effectively in Sierra Leone, inflicting major defeats on the RUF 
without a single allegation of human rights abuse.72 Interestingly, EO also attempted to prevent 
violence between the CDF and the SLA, physically separating members of the two parties on 
several occasions.73 
However, the presence of foreign soldiers does not wholly account for the Sierra Leone’s 
improved stability. EO was only active in Sierra Leone from 1995 to 1996 before its contract 
was revoked in accordance with the terms of the Abidjan Peace Accord.74 Although other foreign 
units later participated in the conflict, their numbers were fairly limited.75 For example, the 
British mission in Sierra Leone was formed around a core of just 800 paratroopers.76 As such, 
significant areas of the country were not affected by the foreign intervention. Many CDF units 
had little or no contact with these foreign soldiers. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the entire 
CDF’s behavior could have been affected. Furthermore, the CDF operated in a relatively benign 
manner even in those periods were foreign troops were not present. This fact would suggest that 
the CDF’s stabilizing behavior was largely independent of foreign influence. 
                                                 
72 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2, 89. 
73 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 125. 
74 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (Indiana University 
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The second theory postulates that the CDF had a positive effect on stability because of its 
unique identity as a guild of traditional village defenders. The CDF’s example thus exaggerates 
the stabilizing effects of corporate VNSAs. Other, more typical corporate groups would have 
behaved differently, would not have been nearly as incentivized to aid civilians, and would not 
have affected stability so positively. As a result, the CDF constitutes an anomaly and is therefore 
not a generalizable case. 
This concern is valid; the CDF certainly represents an exceptional scenario. Most 
corporate VNSAs are unlikely to be as successful at creating stability. However, the experience 
of Sierra’s Leone Civil Defense Forces still provides a useful case in that it reveals the potential 
for corporate actors to improve stability. The example of the CDF shows what the ideal VNSA is 
capable of achieving in a less than ideal environment. Although other corporate groups may not 
be as successful, they can still affect stability in a positive manner. Recognizing and acting on 
this potential utility may be crucial in future conflicts. 
 
VNSAS AND U.S. POLICY 
The case of Sierra Leone’s Civil Defense Forces suggests that VNSAs do not automatically 
undermine stability. As a result, weak governments may be able to cooperate with VNSAs to 
help provide security in otherwise “ungoverned” territory. Similarly, as the United States pursues 
counterterrorist, counterinsurgent, and post-conflict reconstruction programs in foreign countries, 
it may be able to work alongside some local VNSAs. In fact, many VNSAs may be less illiberal, 
corrupt, and abusive than their local government counterparts, as was the case in Sierra Leone. 
This reality runs counter to the common perception of VNSAs as inherently destabilizing. 
 34 
As the United States and its Western allies are increasingly constrained by economic 
factors, a deliberate policy of partnering with VNSAs to accomplish foreign policy objectives 
has become more attractive. With a reduced ability to intervene directly in foreign territory, 
especially in the form of large-scale military interventions, a strategy of cooperating with 
VNSAs may be necessary to protect U.S. interests throughout the world. For example, the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia militia, and Sunni tribesmen—all VNSAs—have played a crucial role 
in the U.S. campaign against ISIS. Partnering with VNSAs offers a major advantage in that it 
greatly reduces the amount of resources and personnel the United States must invest in the target 
area. As a result, the United States can have a much smaller footprint on the ground. Similarly, 
the relatively low cost of supporting VNSAs allows operations to be accomplished more cheaply 
than through direct forms of intervention.  
 
When should states partner with VNSAs? 
VNSAs have the potential to undertake a wide scope of missions, ranging from basic law 
enforcement to proxy warfare.77 Individual groups will be better suited to accomplishing specific 
tasks depending on their unique institutional characteristics and the environment in which they 
operate. For governments seeking to foster stability, they should avoid partnering with VNSAs 
that either directly profit from force of arms (clientelist actors) or those that are organized around 
                                                 
77 The potential of VNSAs to fulfill a variety of objectives is exemplified by the case of Iran. Iran is currently 
partnered with VNSAs in at least four different areas. In western Afghanistan, Iran supports local militias, both 
Sunni and Shia, against the Taliban. This action stabilizes Iran’s eastern border, providing a buffer zone from 
insurgency and instability. In Iraq, Iranian-backed Shia militias serve as one of the country’s most competent 
fighting forces, increasing Iran’s influence in Iraq, defending Shia holy sites and pilgrims (many of whom are 
Iranians), and protecting Iran’s western border. In Lebanon, Iran supports Hezbollah, a proxy through which it can 
engage Israel. Finally, in Yemen, Iranian backing for Shia Houthi rebels has destabilized Saudi Arabia’s southern 
border, weakening the Sunni kingdom’s strategic position. 
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ascriptive identities (communal actors).78 Working with corporate groups avoids the pitfalls of 
cooperating with either clientelist or communal VNSAs. Corporate actors have little or no 
incentive to prolong warfare as it limits the profits of their trade. They also do not pose an 
inherent threat to any national community, although, as we have seen, they can still pose a threat 
to state institutions. While at first glance corporate groups may seem to be odd candidates for 
security providers, they are uniquely qualified to perform that role. Their potential for providing 
security as a positive externality—what Ken Menkhaus terms a “security shadow”—is 
particularly promising and should be investigated further.79 In general, the United States will 
most likely seek to employ VNSAs for counternarcotics and counterinsurgency campaigns, 
operations for which corporate VNSAs’ positive effects on stability are an advantage. 
Just as corporate VNSAs can be used to stabilize a territory, clientelist and especially 
communal groups may be deliberately employed to cause instability. A number of states have 
recognized the destabilizing potential of these types of VNSAs. For example, the Sudanese 
government has recruited a number of predominantly Arab pastoralist groups to serve as militias. 
These communal VNSAs, called the Janjaweed or “devil horsemen” by their enemies, have been 
deployed in Sudan’s western Darfur region, antagonizing the local sedentary communities. 
Darfur serves as a base of power for opposition movements, so destabilizing the territory actually 
serves the government’s interests, weakening and dividing its rivals. By supporting the 
Janjaweed, the government has undermined the resources of its opponents at a very low cost to 
itself, essentially using the VNSA as a weapon of denial.80 Similarly, it is probable that some 
                                                 
78 Communal groups are not nearly as destabilizing if the area’s population is totally homogenous. However, this 
scenario is very rare. 
79 Menkhaus, “Local Security Systems in Somali East Africa.” 
80 Usman A. Tar, “Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards? Civil Militia and State Violence in Darfur Region, 
Western Sudan,” in Civil Militia; Theresa Whelan, interview with the author, 20 November 2014. 
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governments will use VNSAs as destabilizing agents in foreign territory, a possibility that the 
United States and allied governments should consider before supporting any non-state actor. 
Naturally, there are some VNSAs with which it will be unacceptable for the United States 
to cooperate directly. This category would include, for example, VNSAs that produce narcotics 
or those that are ideologically opposed to the United States. Furthermore, there are risks to 
collaborating with any VNSA, even corporate actors. Groups that produce considerable revenue, 
such as some particularly industrious corporate actors, may increase the potential for corruption. 
Similarly, some VNSAs can be vulnerable to cooption by political parties, as is the case with the 
Bakassi Boys in Nigeria; the militia has increasingly become an instrument of political 
intimidation.81 In all cases, it is vital to remember that VNSAs are rarely static entities; their 
structure, objectives, and behavior can change, sometimes very quickly. Consequently, the 
United States should closely observe partner VNSAs, continuously reevaluating their reliability 
and utility. 
 The model presented in this paper is designed to be a useful heuristic for policy makers. 
Ecological approaches of analyzing VNSAs, such as the method advocated by Troy Thomas, 
will provide a deeper understanding of any particular group’s behavior and tendencies. 82 
However, this form of analysis requires considerable intelligence on and local knowledge of the 
VNSA, its environment, and other actors. This information may not be always available, 
especially within a limited timeframe. As such, classifying VNSAs by organization type offers a 
straightforward and quick means to attain an initial understanding of an actor, its behavior, and 
its potential effects on stability. 
                                                 
81 Omeje, “The Egbesu and Bakassi Boys,” in Civil Militia; Johannes Harnischfeger, “The Bakassi Boys: fighting 
crime in Nigeria,” Modern African Studies 41, no. 1 (2003). See William Reno’s Warlord Politics and African 
States for a greater discussion of this danger. 
82 Bartolomei, Casebeer, and Thomas, “Modeling Violent Non-State Actors.” 
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What if there are no corporate VNSAs available? 
In some scenarios, there may not be any viable corporate actor with which to cooperate, so the 
United States may have to work alongside other types of VNSAs. In fact, a number of current 
U.S. and allied counterinsurgent and counterterrorist programs rely on non-corporate VNSAs. 
Often, these are communal groups, as is the case in Iraq, Mali, and Afghanistan (the Afghan 
Local Defense Forces). More rarely, the United States cooperates with clientelist actors, such as 
Afghan warlords.83 While it may be riskier than working with corporate VNSAs, communal and 
clientelist groups do not necessarily cause greater instability. When working with these types of 
VNSAs, action can be taken to mitigate their particular risks. 
If the United States cooperates with a communal actor, political and diplomatic efforts 
should be made to alleviate fears among other ethnic, religious, or geographic communities, 
thereby reducing the possibility of societal instability. For example, when arming Afghan village 
defense forces, instead of cooperating with just one community, U.S. forces could support all of 
the local villages equally to avoid disrupting their balance of power. This action would empower 
the villagers relative to Taliban insurgents, yet would limit the risk of inter-communal warfare. 
Cooperating with a clientelist actor can be more challenging as such groups derive wealth 
and power from the presence, or at least the threat, of conflict. States can partially mitigate the 
risk of instability by reducing contact between the clientelist actor and vulnerable sources of 
wealth, particularly the civilian population. For example, mercenaries should ideally be 
employed in conflict zones with a minimal civilian presence; such groups should not be used for 
law enforcement in civilian areas. States that seek to employ clientelist VNSAs should do so to 
                                                 
83 Joseph Goldstein, “Afghan Militia Leaders, Empowered by U.S. to Fight Taliban, Inspire Fear in Villages,” New 
York Times, 17 March 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/world/asia/afghan-militia-leaders-empowered-by-
us-to-fight-taliban-inspire-fear-in-villages.html?_r=1 (14 April 2015); Ulrich Schneckener, “State Building or New 
Modes of Governance? The Effects of International Involvement in Areas of Limited Statehood,” in Risse, 
Governance without a State?. 
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combat a specific adversary, preferably in a conventional warfare setting. Once that mission is 
accomplished, the clientelist actor should be removed, disbanded, or otherwise disarmed as 
quickly as possible. 
However, in some conflict environments, minimizing exposure to clientelist VNSAs may 
be impossible. For example, the Afghan government continues to rely on warlords to provide 
local security in some regions. This role necessitates close and prolonged contact between the 
clientelist forces and the civilian population. In these scenarios, it may be possible to shape the 
behavior of the clientelist actor itself. The local incentive structure must be shifted such that the 
clientelist actor is motivated to act in a stability-inducing manner. While research suggests that 
this process may happen naturally in some scenarios, it can also be artificially prompted if, for 
example, support for the VNSA is explicitly contingent on the group’s good behavior.84 
 
How should the United States engage with VNSAs? 
If the United States and its allies cooperate with VNSAs, they will need to establish an 
institutional framework within which to interact with these groups. VNSAs are in almost all 
cases extra-legal entities, and their collaboration with the state poses serious legal and often 
political challenges. This difficulty is especially acute with transnational VNSAs, adding further 
legal, political, and social complications. The United States must recognize these difficulties and 
find a means of addressing them in a systematic, comprehensive, and farsighted manner. For 
example, U.S. policy makers should devise standards of accountability in order to oversee the 
behavior of partner VNSAs in a consistent fashion. 
An equally important consideration is how the United States interacts with host nations, 
states in which VNSAs operate. The United States’ VNSA partners may not have good relations 
                                                 
84 Menkhaus, “Local Security Systems in Somali East Africa.” 
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with the local government, causing significant political complications. Similarly, some 
governments, or elements within the regime, can actually be threatened by increased stability, 
even within their own territory; in the case of Sierra Leone, factions within the SLA were 
directly benefiting from the country’s insecurity.85 These groups may seek to undermine the U.S. 
campaign and its VNSA partners, a risk that should be considered before initiating any foreign 
operation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the common perception of violent non-state actors as inherently destabilizing, many 
VNSAs have the potential to bolster security. This paper suggests that corporate actors, those 
VNSAs organized around a non-ascriptive identity, are the most likely to contribute positively to 
stability. In the case of Sierra Leone’s civil war, the Civil Defense Forces, a corporate VNSA, 
played a crucial role in defeating the RUF insurgency and reinstating the democratic 
government. If the United States and its allies partner with suitable VNSAs, the CDF’s success 
can be replicated in other conflict areas. 
In order to realize this potential, further research should be undertaken to better 
understand VNSA dynamics, particularly the effects of external support. It is likely that the 
content, means, and origin of outside support all have substantial effects on a VNSA’s relative 
strength and behavior. For example, in areas where the population is vehemently anti-American, 
overt U.S. material support for a VNSA may actually serve to decrease the actor’s relative 
strength. Similarly, additional research should focus on how VNSAs operate in various 
environments. In particular, a group’s behavior is likely to diverge from that described here when 
operating in foreign territory. 
                                                 
85 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States. 
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This paper has examined VNSA effects on stability. However, two other criteria are 
equally important for choosing ideal VNSA partners. First, the group should be effective at 
accomplishing its mission, whether combating U.S. enemies or providing basic law and order in 
a remote region. Second, VNSA partners should not pose a threat to allied governments, whether 
directly or by indirectly undermining a host nation’s legitimacy. More research should be done to 
investigate these two additional criteria. 
As the process of technological democratization continues to intensify, VNSAs are 
increasingly powerful actors on the world stage. Especially in light of decreasing U.S. economic 
dominance, the United States can no longer afford to ignore non-state groups or view them as 
inherently less significant than state actors. On the one hand, the United States must have the 
capability and foresight to defend itself from hostile VNSAs, particularly terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda. However, if the United States is to maintain its influence and protect its interests 
abroad, it must also be able to work alongside friendly VNSAs. For a foreign policy community 
that cut its teeth in the state-centric dynamics of the Cold War world, this new, collaborative 
approach will require a paradigm shift in U.S. strategic thinking. Given the rate at which VNSAs 
are adapting to a flatter, less state-controlled world, that change cannot come too soon. 
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